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This talk deals with the economic implications of the ongoing dematerialization
in economic activityÐin consumption and in productionÐthat we observe of
modern, advanced economies as they evolve and grow.
By dematerialization, I mean that extreme situation where economic value is
embedded in logical unitsÐbits and bytes of (possibly computer, possibly biolog-
ical) memory. The distinction made is against the other extreme, that historical
one where economic value manifests in concrete, physical, and material form.
Although my intent is more general (as we will turn to below) I ®nd it helpful
to have in mind clear examples of these polar extremesÐof dematerialization and
its oppositeÐbefore we plow further into the discussion.
Think, therefore, of computer software or gene sequences on the one hand;
and titanium non-stick frying pans or an oil super-tanker on the other. All four
of these can be identi®ed with the very latest in space-age technology; all four
of these are things that are inconceivable to earlier generations; all four of these
have likely affected the well-being of each of us at some point. All, therefore,
are instances of technical innovations that have taken advanced economies to the
very frontier of the technology envelope.
At the same time, however, it should be apparentÐif for now in the talk
only at an instinctual levelÐthat the ®rst two objects differ profoundly from the
last two. The ®rst two are dematerialized: they would retain their economic
value independent of the physical medium containing them. The last two are
not dematerialized: their economic values are the values that they are precisely
because these objects have the physical manifestation that they do.
Observers have, traditionally, labeled these instances of disembodied and
embodied technical changeÐand left things at that. I wish to convince you that
there is economic signi®cance beyond just thisÐand I wish also to convince you
that economies that are signi®cantly dematerialized, or weightless (as in the title
of this lecture), behave differently from ones that are not.
Moreover, I will suggest that, in reality, leading, advanced economies are
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already signi®cantly weightless, and therefore it is important to understand the
consequences of these changes.
The remainder of this talk falls naturally into three parts. First, I describe
some ®ndings of recent empirical research on economic growth across countries
and on the dynamic behavior of income distributions across people within soci-
eties. Why these ®ndings relate to the main dematerialization theme of the talk
may yet be unclear. However, they set the stage and raise concrete, substantive
questions. They make explicit the broad sweep of economic realities that we wish
to understand, and eventually to explain. It is convenient also to talk here about
an important idea from recent theoretical research in endogenous growth, namely
the idea of non-rivalry or in®nite expansibility in technical progress.
Next, I will turn to some quick-and-dirty observations on dematerialization.
Each of us has probably thought some about economic growth; each of us has
used computers and thus software; and each of us has likely read a little about
the history of inventions. These ®rst observations then simply make explicit some
immediate and useful connections relating those ideas. Not much will be needed
here of subtle economic analysis. The observations are of the kind where one
might simply say, ªOh, ok,º and that would be the end of that.
But then in the following section I will build on those observations to provide
some more subtle implications. The concepts appearing hereÐpublic goods,
demand and supply, externalities, natural monopolies, and so onÐwill already
be familiar. But how they assume signi®cance in dematerialized economies is
novel and, most important, immediately relevant in reality.
Finally a brief conclusion ends the presentation.
2. The Facts: Economic Realities in the Large
Many here will already be aware of the large quantity of recent economic research
on the determinants of growth and catching-up, or `convergence' across countries.
(Robert Barro's Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures this year provided a useful
overview of that work.)
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That research has achieved resonance with the public: UK politicians and
journalists now phrase discussions in terms of ªendogenous growth theoryº. Pol-
icy makers at the European Commission use notions like convergence to formulate
programs for redistribution across European regions.
But that empirical research on growth and convergenceÐwhich we can think
of as applying traditional methods of analysisÐfails to uncover certain interesting
facts. Fig. 1 shows some of these.
Fig. 1 is a `busy' picture. Many things go on in it; we will need to appreciate
what they are for the discussion to follow next.
In Fig. 1, the horizontal axis denotes movement in time: proceeding right-
wards takes us away from the past and into the future. The vertical axis measures
per capita incomes. These would be per capita incomes for countries or regions
(in certain studies), or just incomes for individuals or families when we turn to
income distributions across people within societies.
For a ®xed instant or year or generation t, the shaded region represents a
then-extant distribution of income. Any given shaded area thus measures the
fraction of the cross section having particular levels of income.
As drawn in Fig. 1, period t has most of the cross section middle classÐthe
bulge in the distribution is at medium income levelsÐfew are very rich; few very
poor. As time progresses, the distribution evolves to that depicted at time t + s.
As drawn, the situation is then very different: there is a peak or a cluster at a high
income level, and one at a low income level. The middle class is vanishing.
(The arrows show intra-distribution or churning behavior: some of the rich
at time t+ s were already rich at the earlier time t; similarly some of the poor at
t + s were already poor at t. However, one also observes transitions of poor to
rich, and vice versa from rich to poor.)
We can collapse the rich variety of dynamics that we see in this `emerging
twin peaks' ®gure into two observations that will remain important later:
(i) increasing inequality (from the spreading out of the distributions over time)
and;
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(ii) emerging strati®cation or polarization (from the peaks or modes appearing
in the distributions at later time periods).
Within clusters, convergence happens; across clusters, it does not.
These conclusionsÐwhich we will hereafter call twin-peaks dynamicsÐ
obtain from more recent research on patterns of cross-country growth; they are
conclusions unavailable in the traditional approach. Moreover, some economists
conjecture that exactly such twin-peaks dynamics hold also for individuals and
families within countries. Work is now under way investigating that.
A subtlety is useful to notice here: Since t + s in Fig. 1 may only be in the
future, not in the historical sample, the situation for time t+ s need not be directly
observable. Some model is required to make these predictions; it was exactly
such a model I used to derive Fig. 1.
When we subsequently discuss dematerialization, one of the most useful
bene®ts from that discussion is to provide some understanding of the economic
forces underlying the twin-peaks dynamics in Fig. 1.
Before continuing to that, however, it is useful to close the current discussion
of cross-country growth by describing the notion of in®nite expansibility (or
non-rivalry) of technical change. For the current discusssion, it is this that is
profound and important in endogenous growth theory. And, it is by extending
the applicability of this notion that we can best grasp the economic signi®cance of
ongoing dematerialization.
An economic object is said to be in®nitely expansible when its use by some-
one does not physically detract from its usefulness to someone else. Thus, the
set of computer instructions underlying a word-processing package is in®nitely
expansible. Someone in Palo Alto, California can use that set of instructions
without making those instructions any less useful to me when I am typing in my
of®ce at LSE. The same observation applies to the computer code that makes up a
Web browser, as well as to the information content of the Web page that is being
browsed.
A chocolate hobnob is not in®nitely expansible. When someone in this audi-
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ence consumes a hobnob, it is no longer useful in the same way to anyone else.
In the usual stories for endogenous growth, in®nitely expansible instructions are
embedded in new production technologies, and while some of this ¯ow of ideas
can be privately owned, other parts of it add to a public stock of knowledge.1
Accumulation of that stock drives economic growth.
Put differently, this idea of in®nite expansibility in technical progress is
used in traditional endogenous growth theory to explain how already advanced
economies can continue to grow. It has, arguably, succeeded at this. But in®nite
expansibility has other interesting aspects to it. We turn now to those and then to
dematerialization proper.
3. Dematerialization, 1
In the importance of in®nite expansibility for endogenous growth, it is irrelevant
whether new ideas are put to work in computer software, or in a spinning jenny,
an open-hearth furnace, or anything else productive.
Thus, the notion of in®nite expansibility does not by itself provide immediate
insights into the workings of a dematerialized economy. Of course, it is a great
strength of the in®nite expansibility notion that it is so general: it aids understand-
ing of technical change in Renaissance times, during the Industrial Revolution,
and over the 20th centryÐall simultaneously and without alteration. But that also
means there will be features of dematerialization that it does not capture well.
Thomas Jefferson had, in fact, already recognized the importance of the
in®nite-expansibility idea much earlier:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to
1 In the language used in this literature, this means that these non-rival objects
are also partly excludable. This latter concept will not be of as great interest in the
current discussion.
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himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession
of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made
them, like ®re, expansible over all space, without lessening their density
at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have
our physical being, incapable of con®nement or exclusive appropriation.
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
[Thomas Jefferson, 13 Aug. 1813 (letter to I. McPherson)]
The key insight to add in this talk is that with dematerialization, these concerns
apply not only to the ideas underlying technical progress and inventions, but also
to the very things we produce and consume.
The set of instructions underlying the Unix operating system is in®nitely
expansible. Similarly in®nitely expansible are the computer codesets for video
games like Super Mario Brothers 3 and Mortal Kombat, the content in Michael
Jackson and Madonna music videos, Jurassic Park, Batman, and Disney movie
tapes, all of Microsoft's software products, the broadcast content in TV signals,
the collated information on Reuters terminal screens, and so on. Encryption and
decryption algorithms are dematerialized; so is the stuff they encrypt and decrypt.
When economic valueÐproduced and consumedÐis embedded in bits rather
than atoms, Jefferson's comments can be addressed not just to inventors and
research scientists but to every economic agent. But then the ªpeculiar characterº
that Jefferson refers to magni®es and grows.
International trade becomes not a matter of shipping wine and textiles from
± 7 ±
one country to the next, but of bouncing bits off satellites. With economic value
having no clear points of physical entry and exit, international trade statistics
become that much murkier and ambiguous. Keeping track of trade is no longer
just counting the bottles and bales that pile up on the loading docks in a port.
Dematerialized economic value cannot respect geographical, physical, or
national boundaries. Put differently, transportation shows in®nite bandwidth
when moving bits across space. In contrast, when moving atoms, bandwidth is
limited and thus transportation costs and political boundaries matter.
This ªgrowing weightlessness of GNPº is not a move away from manufac-
turing and towards services as traditionally construed. It is not just a change from
an economy that makes big iron or cranks out heavy-metal construction cranes to
an economy that makes hotel beds or provides janitorial support.
In the USÐa leading, advanced, and successfully growing economyÐby
most accounts, dematerialized industries have already replaced defence and au-
tomobiles as the driving force in the economy. Data show that dematerialized
industries already account for the largest volume of US exports (bigger than air-
craft), and generate the greatest number of high-quality new jobs (more than
health care).
However, national economies are but one instance of large-scale organized
economic activity. Case studies show how successful corporationsÐsuch as GE,
Nintendo, Ericsson, Bell Labs, Texas Instruments, and of course MicrosoftÐrealize
the signi®cance and exploit the nature of the dematerialized things they produce.
These organizations meet and work across large geographical expanse, as though
physical distance weren't important. In these networked corporations, managers
and production processes emphasize and exploit proximity in the space of ideas,
not closeness in the sense of geography.
Macroeconomists have, to date, made little of such changes in industrial
structure. But aggregate economies that are dematerialized and weightless must
almost certainly behave differently from those that aren't. We turn now to ®ndings
from studies that have emphasized this distinction.
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4. Dematerialization, 2
We have, so far, discussed some relatively obvious aspects of dematerializationÐ
these concern ready implications from the physically disembodiment of demate-
rialized objects. In this part of the talk, we consider implications that might not
be as obvious or as immediate.
The transfer of dematerialized objects occurs in ways different from that in
traditional economic exchange. First, such objects cannot be really transferred,
but merely replicated: the originating agent in a transaction cannot physically and
credibly relinquish ownership of abstract content or ideas. For these commodities,
trade is not exchange, but instead reproduction.
Second, trade in such objects is costly for some agents involved in the trans-
action, but not for others. When the dematerialized objects take the form of
innovative ideas, they necessarily show an incomplete knowability: some ideas
are good ones, others are bad, but they are impossible to discern ahead of time. If
testing out the quality of ideas is costly, then free disposal by a receiving agent is
no longer available. When, by contrast, the dematerialized objects take the form
of software or broadcast content, they can be consumed only with the appropriate
enveloping hardware. Thus, dematerialized content, while freely reproducible by
the originating agent, is costly for a receiving one to use.
Third, consumption of dematerialized content often involves network exter-
nalities. A software product might be seen by technical experts to be inferior to
a competing product, but ends up being used anyway because everyone else in
one's workplace or circle of acquaintances already uses it. Bene®ts from collective
insight into the quirks and shortcomings of the product may outweigh those from
the isolated use of a technically superior alternative.
Fourth, successful dematerialized production does not entail a large upfront
®xed cost. Unlike, say, requiring the experience, history, and manufacturing base
of a General Motors or a British Aerospace to produce the next successful car or
aeroplane, it only takes, in principle, one programmer with a C compiler working
alone to produce the next killer application.
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Fifth, with dematerialization, markets are no longer local or national, but
instantaneously universal. Since transportation costs are irrelevant and transmis-
sion bandwidth is in®nite, the natural marketplace for dematerialized objects is
essentially unbounded.
Theoretical research studying the effects of these characteristics are only in
early stages. Models being investigated are still abstract and highly stylized but
the preliminary ®ndings are intriguing. In some of these models, subgroups in
societies form knowledge-based coalitions; a class structure endogenously em-
erges. Over time, small differences across social groups magnify. Depending on
initial circumstances, patterns of polarization and strati®cation appear.
Distributions of wealth and income become more unequal as ªsuperstarº
effects take hold. To understand such effects, it is easiest to begin by asking, Why
is the income distribution across opera singers so much more unequal than that
across shoemakers? The reasons are two-fold, one on the demand side of the
market, and the other on the supply side. Taking supply ®rst, the production of
opera by an individual singer is, on the margin, costless. Content in a performance
by Cecilia Bartoli or Angela Gheorgiou can be broadcast to 2 people or 10,000, with
no difference in effort by the sopranos concerned. Turning to demand, an audience
prefers to listen to a single performance by either of these than to two performances
by singers thought to be less talented. Objective criteria might show that for most
listeners second- and third-ranked singers are barely distinguishable from the very
best one, but nevertheless, the market share these second- and third-stringers
have will be a discrete step below those of top acclaimed performers. In such
superstar or ªwinner-take-allº situations, market size determines the distribution
of incomes, magnifying up slight differences in talent. This contrasts with the
workings of standard invisible-hand economies where income distribution and
market size are unrelated.
Drawing the connections between the characteristics I have described above
of dematerialized objects and those we have just seen of superstar economies,
we see that increasing income inequality comes with ongoing dematerializa-
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tion. However, dematerialization conditions add a further twist to these predic-
tions. In standard superstar economies, it is the distribution of talentÐgiven as
endowmentsÐthat determine winners and losers. In dematerialized economies,
however, winners and losers are made, not born. Thus, a dynamic dimension
becomes important. In standard superstar economies, endowments are talent,
®xed from birth, and thus those show in®nite ®xed costs of entry. But in dema-
terialized economies ®xed costs of entry are minimal. Hence, at the same time
that income inequalities become more extreme, mobility between rich and poor
also rises. Societies then are willing to tolerate the increasing inequality because,
simultaneously, greater fractions of the poor see opportunity to transit to being
rich.2
Combining these different studies, it happens that their predictions ®t well
with the ªemerging twin-peaksº dynamics of Fig. 1. Whether it is this demat-
erialization that is responsible for those features is still unclear, but further inves-
tigation is on the research agenda.
However, regardless of the outcome on that investgation, it is already clear
that dematerialized economies show intriguingly different properties than dis-
played in traditional ones.
5. Conclusion
This lecture has presented some facts and theoretical ®ndings relating to the
increasing dematerialization in modern, advanced economies.
The ªemerging twin-peaksº picture in Fig. 1 manifests when one studies
cross-country income distributions. I have used the subtleties associated with
dematerialization to explain such tendencies. The ª®tº between stories and facts
is far from perfect, but peculiariaties of dematerialization do predict both an
2 Public acceptance of the National LotteryÐthis trade off between, on the
one hand, regressiveness and inequality and, on the other hand, mobility and
prospects of success (whether or not those are rationally evaluated) may re¯ect
something similar.
increasing inequality and a clustering or polarization in the cross section. These
effects likely have more to do with people within societies than with countries
across the world, but similar forces might well be at work in both.
Parts of this talk have also described other aspects of dematerialization.
Likely, those too have further economic signi®cance. Work is in progress ex-
ploring those as well.
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A.1. Introduction
Modern, advanced economies grow through technical progress. Such a proposi-
tion follows logically from just a little bit of analytical reasoningÐand should not
be at all controversial. The open questions are only the nature and source of that
technical progress. Almost all economic analyses of growth now focus, rightly,
on technical change. Only with ongoing technical progress, can factor inputs in
limited supplyÐlike physical capital and human laborÐproduce outputs in ever
greater quantity and quality for societies to consume. It is thus that productivity
and economic welfare increase.
Comparing present and historical economic realities, however, it is obvious
that technical progress now differs profoundly from technical progress then: eco-
nomic value, whether being consumed or produced, increasingly comes embodied
in virtual units of logicÐbits and bytesÐrather than embedded in solid material
of physical substance. Current frontier developments are designs embedded in
software; previous frontier developments were concepts brought to physical life,
for instance in a spinning jenny. Economists' concept of GNP would value mod-
ern software independently of how exactly the latter appears in physical form,
or indeed of whether it does so at all. This is correct and proper. The nature of
technical progress and thus of economic growth and consumption and production
have changed. Most concepts of what is valuableÐthe things that people enjoy
and consumeÐappropriately adjust to re¯ect that.
But while almost all modern theories of economic growth place technical
progress center stage, this change in the nature of technology is not typically
acknowledged explicitly. Most economists have traditionally thought it unimpor-
tant to distinguish between, on the one hand, technical progress that comes in the
form of things like high-tech, titanium, non-stick frying pans, and, on the other,
technical progress that comes in the form of things like software and information
technology.
This paper describes some recent research that does draw that distinction,
and indicates its importance. In this work, researchers are interested in the im-
plications of ongoing dematerialization in modern economiesÐan ªincreasing
weightlessness of GNP.º This paper highlights conceptual subtleties in analyzing
dematerialized economies; it then uses those subtleties to help explain certain
stylized facts, regularities that we already observe in many modern economies.
The paper proceeds as follows. For background, it begins by describing
some new empirical ®ndings on patterns of cross-country development. These
®ndings differ from those obtained by more traditional means: the ®ndings lead
to characterizing cross-country patterns of development in terms of strati®cation
and polarization, not simply in terms of ongoing growth and convergence. Why
this should be relevant for thinking about weightless economies may not yet be
apparent: we turn next to making clear that connection.
The paper describes an idea much used recently to explain technical change
and endogenous growth, namely that of in®nite expansibility. Typically, however,
this concept has been used only to understand how technological progress comes
about, not to understand the nature of modern technical change.
The paper broadens application of this idea, and describes the conceptual
subtleties that arise as a result. Appreciating these subtleties helps explain the
patterns of strati®cation and polarization documented below, and generates pre-
dictions for what will ensue as economies continue to dematerialize.
The paper then concludes by highlighting particular areas for continuing
research.
A.2. Some ready observations
 Growth and ideas. Technical progress.
 Cross-country growth; facts. (Figure 1.) Twin peaks. Polarization and strati-
®cation in income distributions.
 In®nite expansibility (non-rivalry). The knowledge and abstract ideas that
underly technical progress: What happens if they do not remain just determi-
nant of technical change, but become also the things that economies produce
and consume?
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession
of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made
them, like ®re, expansible over all space, without lessening their density
at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have
our physical being, incapable of con®nement or exclusive appropriation.
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
[Thomas Jefferson, 13 Aug. 1813 (letter to I. McPherson)]
A.3. Economic implications a little less obvious
 Economic values embedded in bits; economic value embedded in atoms:
software and information versus space-age titanium frying pans.
 Dematerialization; weightlessness in reality. Not janitorial services. Exports;
high-quality jobs; driver of technical change. Case studies: GE, Nike, Nin-
tendo, Ericsson, Texas Instruments, Bell Labs Research.
 Value independent of physical manifestation.
 In®nite bandwidth in transferring across space. Moving bits, not atoms.
 Irrelevance of physical geography. And national boundaries?
 Exchange and transfer: not wine and textiles. Thomas Jefferson again.
 Differential knowability.
 Irreversibility.
 Value increases, the more the commodity is out there.
 Superstars, winner-take-all economies; but with mobility. Why is the income
distribution across opera singers so much more unequal than that across
shoemakers? What dynamic considerations might make societies tolerate
inequality?
A.4. Conclusion
 Twin peaks fact: patterns of cross-country development and within-country
income distributions.
 Dematerialization: fragmentary and impressionistic evidence; much more
documentation required.
 Subtle economic properties.




Fig. 1: Emerging twin-peaks distribution dynamics
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